## 1NC

### Off

Reject the 1AC’s call for the ballot –

It is a moment of interest convergence between the Affirmative and the judge – This rhetorical alliance with alterity is a technology of political demand that repeats the strategic attitude of the system it seeks to overturn – The guilty solidarity of the 1AC masks the privilege that prevents the AFF project from directly changing the lives of the people they invoke to warrant a ballot.

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 16-17)

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but **how they can resist**, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against **a hegemony which already includes them** and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation between borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, **many** deep-rooted, **politically reactionary forces return** to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested **claims** **of oppression and victimization** that **are used** merely **to guilt-trip and to control**; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises **remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are **battles of words**. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly **not** directly **changing the** downtrodden **lives of those who seek** their **survival** in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate **from their** “oppositional” **viewpoint**, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

It is a form of self-subalternization, where the judge is encouraged to found solidarity with the Affirmative Other by valorizing suffering portrayed in the 1AC – However, their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that produce alterity in the first place, turning the case at a higher level of analysis.

Chow – Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown - 1993

(Rey, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, p. 10-11)

The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. Arif Dirlik, who has written extensively on the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy"—"a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as "spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the Maoist is very much alive among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically, the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with capitalism—a cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the one that is supporting her own undertaking. The Maoist is thus a supreme example of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since what is valorized is often the other's deprivation—"having" poverty or "having" nothing—the Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the material power that enables her rhetoric.

The subaltern is subsequently reduced to a fungible object, a passive object for the consumption of the debate community – the affirmative absorbs the power of alterity only to toss its carcass back into the dust

Chow 93 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon, Professor of the Humanities at Brown University, Writing Diaspora: Contemporary Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, Indiana University Press, pg. 12-13.)

In the “cultural studies” of the American academy in the 1990s. The Maoist is reproducing with prowess. We see this in the way terms such as “oppression,” “victimization,” and “subalternity” are now being used. Contrary to the Orientalist disdain for the contemporary native cultures in the non-West, the Maoist turns the precisely disdained other into the object of his/her study and, in some cases identification. In a mixture of admiration and moralist, the Maoist sometimes turns all people from non-Western cultures into a generalized “subaltern” that is then used to flog an equally generalized “West.” Because the representation of “the other” as such ignores (1) the class and intellectual hierarchies within these other cultures, which are usually as elaborate as those in the West, and (2) the discursive power relations structuring the Maoist’s mode of inquiry and valorization, it produces a way of talking in which notions of lack, subalternity, victimization and so forth are drawn upon indiscriminately, often with the intention of spotlighting the speaker’s own sense of alterity and political righteousness. A comfortably wealthy white American intellectual I know claimed that he was a “third world intellectual” citing as one of his credentials his marriage to a Western European woman of part-Jewish heritage; a professor of English complained about being “victimized” by the structured time at an Ivy League Institution, meaning that she needed to be on time for classes; a graduate student of upper-class background from one of the world’s poorest countries told his American friends that he was of poor peasant stock in order to authenticate his identity as a radical “third worlder representative; male and female academics across the U.S. frequently say they were “raped” when they report experiences of professional frustration and conflict. Whether sincere or delusional, such cases of self-dramatization all take the route of self-sub-alternization, which has increasingly become the assured means to authority and power. What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and thus depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand. The oppressed, whose voices we seldom hear, are robbed twice - the first time of their economic chances, the second time of their language, which is no longer distinguishable from those who have had our consciousnesses “raised.”

### Off

The affirmative’s critical pedagogy is change in the service of human freedom, taking for granted human/animal opposition – belief that language elevates biological value normalizes violence

Bell and Russell, 2000 (Anne and Constance, Canadian journal of education, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

Take, for example, Freire’s (1990) statements about the differences¶ between “Man” and animals. To set up his discussion of praxis and the¶ importance of “naming” the world, he outlines what he assumes to be¶ shared, commonsensical beliefs about humans and other animals. He¶ defines the boundaries of human membership according to a sharp, hierarchical dichotomy that establishes human superiority. Humans alone, he¶ reminds us, are aware and self-conscious beings who can act to fulfill the¶ objectives they set for themselves. Humans alone are able to **infuse the**¶ **world with their creative presence**, to overcome situations that limit them,¶ and thus to demonstrate a “decisive attitude towards the world” (p. 90). Freire (1990, pp. 87–91) represents other animals in terms of their **lack** of¶ such traits. They are doomed to passively accept the given, their lives¶ “totally determined” because their decisions belong not to themselves but¶ to their species. Thus whereas humans inhabit a “world” which they **create**¶ **and transform and from which they can separate themselves**, for animals¶ there is only habitat, a mere physical space to which they are “organically¶ bound.”¶ To accept Freire’s assumptions is to believe that humans are animals¶ only in a nominal sense. We are different not in degree but in kind, and¶ though we might recognize that other animals have distinct qualities, we¶ as humans are somehow **more unique.** We have the edge over other creatures because we are able to rise above **monotonous**, species-determined¶ biological existence. Change in the service of human freedom is seen to be¶ **our primary agenda.** Humans are thus cast as active agents whose very¶ essence is to **transform the world** – as if somehow acceptance, appreciation,¶ wonder, and reverence were beyond the pale.¶ This discursive frame of reference is characteristic of critical pedagogy.¶ The human/animal opposition upon which it rests is **taken for granted**, its¶ cultural and historical specificity **not acknowledged. And therein lies the**¶ **problem.** Like other social constructions, this one derives its persuasiveness¶ from its “seeming facticity and from the deep investments individuals and¶ communities have in setting themselves off from others” (Britzman et al.,¶ 1991, p. 91). This becomes the normal way of seeing the world, and like¶ other discourses of normalcy, it limits possibilities of taking up and confronting inequities (see Britzman, 1995). The primacy of the human enterprise is simply **not questioned.**¶ Precisely how an anthropocentric pedagogy might exacerbate the environmental crisis has not received much consideration in the literature¶ of critical pedagogy, especially in North America. Although there may be¶ passing reference to planetary destruction, there is seldom mention of the¶ relationship between education and the domination of nature, let alone any¶ sustained exploration of the links between the domination of nature and¶ other social injustices. Concerns about the nonhuman are **relegated** to¶ environmental education. And since environmental education, in turn,¶ remains peripheral to the core curriculum (A. Gough, 1997; Russell, Bell,¶ & Fawcett, 2000), anthropocentrism passes unchallenged. ROOTS OF A CRITIQUE¶ Bowers (1993a, 1993b) has identified a number of root metaphors or “analogs” in critical pedagogy that reinforce the problem of anthropocentric¶ thinking. These include the notion of change as inherently progressive, faith in the power of rational thought, and an understanding of individuals¶ as “potentially free, voluntaristic entities who will take responsibility for¶ creating themselves when freed from societal forms of oppression” (1993a,¶ pp. 25–26). Such assumptions, argues Bowers, are part of the Enlightenment legacy on which critical pedagogy, and indeed liberal education¶ generally, is based. In other words, they are culturally specific and stem¶ from a period in Western history when the modern industrial world view¶ was beginning to take shape.¶ To be fair, Bowers understates the extent to which these assumptions are¶ being questioned within critical pedagogy (e.g., Giroux, 1995; Peters, 1995;¶ Shapiro, 1994; Weiler & Mitchell, 1992, pp. 1, 5). Nevertheless, his main¶ point is well taken: proponents of critical pedagogy have yet to confront¶ the ecological consequences of an educational process that reinforces beliefs¶ and practices formed when unlimited economic expansion and social¶ progress seemed promised (Bowers, 1993b, p. 3). What happens when the¶ expansion of human possibilities is equated with the possibilities of consumption? How is educating for freedom predicated on the exploitation of¶ the nonhuman? Such queries push against taken-for-granted understandings of human, nature, **self**, and community, and thus bring into focus the¶ underlying tension between “freedom” as it is constituted within critical¶ pedagogy and the limits that emerge through consideration of humans’¶ interdependence with the more-than-human world.¶ This tension is symptomatic of anthropocentrism. Humans are assumed¶ to be **free agents** separate from and pitted against the rest of nature, our¶ fulfillment predicated on overcoming material constraints. This assumption¶ of human difference and superiority, central to Western thought since¶ Aristotle (Abram, 1996, p. 77), has long been used to justify the exploitation¶ of nature by and for humankind (Evernden, 1992, p. 96). **It has also been**¶ **used to justify the exploitation of human groups (e.g., women, Blacks,**¶ **queers, indigenous peoples) deemed to be closer to nature – that is,**¶ **animalistic, irrational, savage, or uncivilized** (Gaard, 1997; Haraway, 1989,¶ p. 30; Selby, 1995, pp. 17–20; Spiegel, 1988).¶ This “organic apartheid” (Evernden, 1992, p. 119) is bolstered by the¶ belief that language is an exclusively human property that elevates mere¶ biological existence to meaningful, social existence. Understood in this¶ way, language undermines our embodied sense of interdependence with¶ a more-than-human world. Rather than being a point of entry into the webs¶ of communication all around us, language becomes a medium through¶ which we set ourselves **apart and above.**¶This view of language is deeply embedded in the conceptual framework¶ of critical pedagogy, including poststructuralist approaches. So too is the¶ human/nature dichotomy upon which it rests. When writers assume that “it is language that enables us to think, speak and give meaning to the¶ world around us,” that “meaning and consciousness do not exist outside¶ language” (Weedon, 1987, p. 32) and that “subjectivity is constructed by¶ and in language” (Luke & Luke, 1995, p. 378), then their transformative¶ projects are encoded so as to exclude any consideration of the nonhuman.¶ Such assumptions effectively remove all subjects from nature. As Evernden¶ (1992) puts it, “if subjectivity, willing, valuation, and meaning are securely¶ lodged in the domain of humanity, the possibility of encountering anything¶ more than material objects in nature is **nil**” (p. 108).¶ What is forgotten? What is erased when the real is equated with a¶ proliferating culture of commodified signs (see Luke & Luke, 1995, on¶ Baudrillard)? To begin, we forget that we humans are surrounded by an¶ astonishing diversity of life forms. We no longer perceive or give expression to a world in which everything has intelligence, personality, and¶ voice. Polyphonous echoes are reduced to homophony, a term Kane (1994)¶ uses to denote “the reduced sound of human language when it is used¶ under the assumption that speech is something belonging only to human¶ beings” (p. 192). We forget too what Abram (1996) describes as the gestural,¶ somatic dimension of language, its sensory and physical resonance that we¶ share with all expressive bodies (p. 80).

**And the affirmative’s assertion that Homeland Security Act permanently endowed the state with the power to determine life is ahistorical – humanism is the *original* hierarchy—we need politics that can respect more than human life. Their politics dooms us to a future that endlessly repeats the oppression of the status quo**

**Best, 7** (Steven – Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>) //MD

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that **the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.** ¶ In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that **the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power.** A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. ¶ Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings.¶ The Origins of Hierarchy¶ "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras¶ It is little understood that **the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.** Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for **all other systems of domination** such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” ¶ Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. ¶ In the fifteenth century, **when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves.** Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. ¶ As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. ¶ Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for **speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples.** “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” ¶ Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. ¶ There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.¶

**Our alternative is to endorse the thought experiment of the voluntary global suicide of humanity – that solves**

**Kochi and Ordan, 8** – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>)

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

The affirmative’s struggle for universal “human rights” is not natural – it is explicitly anthropocentric and is the foundation of the dichotomy between “human” and the “environment”

Burdon 12 (Peter Burdon – PhD in Earth Jurisprudence and lecturer at Alelaide Law School, August 10, 2010, “ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS TALK”, http://rightnow.org.au/topics/environment/environmental-protection-and-the-limits-of-rights-talk/) //MD

The rise of environmental human rights

During the 1970s the language of human rights began to make sense to broad communities of people as an “umbrella concept” for combating multiple forms of injustice. Most recently, there has been an attempt to extend human rights for environmental protection. There are two main arguments. First, that human beings have a right to a healthy environment i.e. a right to clean water. Second, that there are ecological limitations to human rights. While not yet implemented in “hard law” the latter argument refers to the idea that individual freedom is not only determined by a social context – but also by an ecological context.¶ Human rights discourse has assumed hegemonic status and is widely billed as “the only game in town” for environmental protection. Yet, many commentators have voiced serious concerns that a human rights model cannot address the root causes of environmental exploitation. To begin, the approach is overtly anthropocentric. Even the phrase “human rights and the environment” is species specific, focuses on “rights” which is an inherently individualistic concept and sets up an immediate dichotomy between the “human” and the “environment”.¶ Linguistics aside, **the very existence of environmental human rights reinforces the idea that the environment and natural resources exist only for human benefit and have no intrinsic worth.** In the example I cited above concerning groundwater pollution, my discussant’s rebuff could easily be viewed as consistent with the ethical framework of environmental human rights. Indeed, no human rights were being infringed, so what is the problem? Thus, while the language of environmental human rights has been seen as a politically useful tool for environmental groups to sway public opinion, it does not fundamentally challenge the mental ideas that partially explain environmental exploitation.¶ A second major critique of environmental human rights is that it seeks to adopt bourgeois legal concepts and treat them as both **universal** and foundational for the development of an alternative social form. In reality, this is no alternative at all since it merely re-inscribes dominant conceptions of value in a supposedly new framework. Foundational documents for environmental human rights discourse, such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Right (1948), have also been used as central documents for market-based individualism. As such, it is doubtful whether they can provide the basis for a thoroughgoing critique of liberal or neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, whether it is politically useful to insist that the capitalist political order live up to its own foundational principles is one thing, but to imagine that this politics can lead to a radical displacement of capitalist growth economics is a serious error.

### Case

Postmodernist critiques reproduce colonial knowledge – their politics locates theory in the North and subjects to be studied in the South – this is epistemic colonialism

Grosfoguel 11 (Ramon Grosfoguel – PhD in sociology and associate professor in Ethnics studies and Chicano/Latino studies at UC Berkeley, 2011, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy: Transmodernity,¶ Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality, http://www.dialogoglobal.com/granada/documents/Grosfoguel-Decolonizing-Pol-Econ-and-Postcolonial.pdf) //MD

In October 1998, there was a conference/dialogue at Duke University ¶ between the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group and the Latin American Subaltern ¶ Studies Group. The dialogue initiated at this conference eventually resulted in the ¶ publication of several issues of the journal NEPANTLA. However, this conference was ¶ the last time the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group met before their split. ¶ Among the many reasons and debates that produced this split, there are two that I ¶ would like to stress. The members of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group ¶ were primarily Latinamericanist scholars in the USA. Despite their attempt at producing a radical and alternative knowledge, they reproduced the epistemic ¶ schema of Area Studies in the United States. With a few exceptions, they produced ¶ studies about the subaltern rather than studies with and from a subaltern ¶ perspective. Like the imperial epistemology of Area Studies, theory was still located ¶ in the North while the subjects to be studied are located in the South. This colonial ¶ epistemology was crucial to my dissatisfaction with the project. As a Latino in the ¶ United States, I was dissatisfied with the epistemic consequences of the knowledge ¶ produced by this Latinamericanist group. They underestimated in their work ¶ ethnic/racial perspectives coming from the region, while giving privilege ¶ predominantly to Western thinkers. This is related to my second point: they gave ¶ epistemic privilege to what they called the “four horses of the apocalypse” (Mallon ¶ 1994; Rodríguez 2001), that is, Foucault, Derrida, Gramsci and Guha. Among the ¶ four main thinkers they privilege, three are Eurocentric thinkers while two of them ¶ (Derrida and Foucault) form part of the poststructuralist/postmodern Western canon. ¶ Only one, Rinajit Guha, is a thinker thinking from the South. By privileging Western ¶ thinkers as their central theoretical apparatus, they betrayed their goal to produce ¶ subaltern studies. ¶ Among the many reasons for the split of the Latin American Subaltern Studies ¶ Group, one of them was between those who read subalternity as a postmodern ¶ critique (which represents a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism) and those who ¶ read subalternity as a decolonial critique (which represents a critique of Eurocentrism ¶ from subalternized and silenced knowledges) [Mignolo 2000: 183-186; 213-214]. ¶ For those of us that took side with the decolonial critique, the dialogue with the Latin ¶ American Subaltern Studies Group made evident the need to epistemologically ¶ transcend, that is, decolonize the Western canon and epistemology. The South ¶ Asian Subaltern Studies Group’s main project is a critique to Western European ¶ colonial historiography about India and to Indian nationalist Eurocentric ¶ historiography of India. But by using a Western epistemology and privileging Gramsci ¶ and Foucault, constrained and limited the radicalism of their critique to Eurocentrism. ¶ Although they represent different epistemic projects, the South Asian Subaltern ¶ School privilege of Western epistemic canon overlapped with the sector of the Latin ¶ American Subaltern Studies Group that sided with postmodernism. However, with all ¶ its limits, South Asian Subaltern Studies Group represents an important contribution ¶ to the critique of Eurocentrism. It forms part of an intellectual movement known as ¶ postcolonial critique (a critique of modernity from the Global South) as opposed to the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group postmodern critique (a critique of ¶ modernity from the Global North) [Mignolo 2000]. These debates made clear to us ¶ (those who took side with the decolonial critique described above), the need to ¶ decolonize not only Subaltern Studies but also Postcolonial Studies (Grosfoguel ¶ 2006a; 2006b). ¶ This is not an essentialist, fundamentalist, anti-European critique. It is a ¶ perspective that is critical of both Eurocentric and Third World fundamentalisms, ¶ colonialism and nationalism. Border thinking, one of the epistemic perspectives to be ¶ discussed in this article, is precisely a critical response to both hegemonic and ¶ marginal fundamentalisms. What all fundamentalisms share (including the ¶ Eurocentric one) is the premise that there is only one sole epistemic tradition from ¶ which to achieve Truth and Universality. However, my main points here are three: 1) ¶ that a decolonial epistemic perspective requires a broader canon of thought than ¶ simply the Western canon (including the Left Western canon); 2) that a truly ¶ universal decolonial perspective cannot be based on an abstract universal (one ¶ particular that raises itself as universal global design), but would have to be the ¶ result of the critical dialogue between diverse critical epistemic/ethical/political ¶ projects towards a pluriversal as oppose to a universal world; 3) that decolonization ¶ of knowledge would require to take seriously the epistemic ¶ perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical thinkers from the Global South thinking ¶ from and with subalternized racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies. Postmodernism ¶ and postructuralism as epistemological projects are caught within the Western canon ¶ reproducing within its domains of thought and practice a particular form of coloniality ¶ of power/knowledge.

## 2NC

### 2NC Impact – OV

Anthropocentrism outweighs

Gottlieb 94 — Roger S. Gottlieb, Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, 1994 (“Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” *Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life*, Summer, Available Online at http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as another across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for ourselves nor for the other, but for us all.

### A2 Pugliese thinks bioptx = root cause (card I cut)

#### Paragraph after their card concludes that the alt solves and anthro is the root cause

Pugliese 13

Joseph Pugliese, Associate Professor of Cultural Studies at Macquarie University specializing in social justice; "State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites,” 2013, pg. 97 //bghs-ms

In order to short-circuit this machine, a deconstructive move is needed, a move that refuses to participate in the mere overturning of the binarized hierarchy, for example: animal > human, and that effectively displaces the hierarchy by disclosing the conceptual aporias that drive it. The challenge is to proceed to inhabit the hiatus, to run the risk of living the ‘emptiness’ of an atopical locus that is neither animal nor human. This non-foundational locus is the space that Agamben designates as ‘the open,’ marked by the ‘reciprocal suspension of the two terms [human/animal], something for which we perhaps have no name and which is neither animal nor [hu]man [and that] settles in between nature and humanity.’ Critically, the reciprocal suspension articulates ‘the play between the two terms, their immediate constellation in a non-coincidence.’23 In naming their constellation in a non-coincidence, Agamben enunciates the possibility of a Levinasian ethics that refuses the anthropocentric assimilation of the Other/animal/nature into the imperialism of the Same/human. The urgent necessity of instigating the move to render inoperative this anthropocentric regime is not incidental to the violent biopolitical operations of the state. On the contrary, **state violence is virulently animated by the** logic of the biopolitical caesura and its ‘**anthropological machine’** – which ‘produce[s] the human through the suspension and capture of the inhuman.’24 The anthropocentrism that *drives this biopolitical regime* ensures that whatever is designated as non-human-animal life continues to be branded not only as expendable and as legitimately enslaveable but as the quintessential ‘unsavable figure of life.’25 The aporetic force that drives this regime is exposed with perverse irony in one of the entries of the al-Qahtani interrogation log, which documents an interrogator reading to the detainee in the course of his torture session two quotes from the book What Makes a Terrorist and Why?: ‘The second quote pointed out that the terrorist must dehumanize their victims and avoid thinking in terms of guilt or innocence.’ In the context of the post-9/11 US gulags, this biopolitical regime of state terror is what guarantees the production of captive life that can be tortured with impunity and that, moreover, enables its categorization as unsavable. Once captive life is thus designated, it can be liquidated without compunction – without having to think ‘in terms of guilt or innocence.’

#### They have it backwards – anthropocentrism is the ORIGINAL HIERARCHY which predated biopolitics – here is specific evidence

Calarco, 8 (Matthew, Asst. Prof of Phil at CSUF, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal From Heidegger to Derrida, June, p. 92-94//Shree)

Agamben gives the name “anthropological machine” (a concept he borrows from the Italian scholar of myth Furio Jesi) to the mechanism underlying our current means of determining the human-animal distinction. This machine can best be understood as the symbolic and material mechanisms at work in various scientific and philosophical discourses that classify and distinguish humans and animals through a dual process of inclusion and exclusion. The first chapters of *The Open* provide the reader with a fascinating overview of some of the historical variations on the anthropological machine at work in a number of authors and discourses, ranging from the philosophy of Georges Bataille and Alexandre Kojeve to the taxonomic studies of Carl Linnaeus and post-Darwinian paleontology. For the purposes of the argument I am developing here, it will suffice to recall the general structure of the machine and why Agamben argues that it is necessary to stop its functioning. Agamben makes a distinction between two key variations on the anthropological machine: the modern and premodern. The modern anthropological machine is post-Darwinian. It seeks to understand, following the principles of natural science, the emergence of the fully constituted human being from out of the order of the human animal (the latter, of course, is in many ways indistinguishable from certain nonhuman animals, especially so-called higher primates). In order to mark this transition, it is necessary to determine and isolate the animal aspects of the human animal and exclude them from humanity proper. Agamben describes this process as involving an “animalization” of certain modes of human life, an attempt to separate out—within human beings themselves—what precisely is animal, on the one hand, and human, on the other. This variation on the anthropological machine gives rise to the search by nineteenth-century paleontologists for the “missing link” that provides the biological transition from speechless ape to speaking human. But it also opens the way for the totalitarian and democratic experiments on and around human nature that function by excluding animal life from human life within human beings. Agamben suggests that “it is enough to move our field of research ahead a few decades, and instead of this innocuous paleontological find we will have the Jew, that is, the non-man produced within the man, or the neomort and the overcomatose person, that is, the animal separated within the human body itself” (O, 37). The premodern form of the anthropological machine, which runs from Aristotle up through Linnaeus, functions in a similar but inverted form. Rather than animalizing certain aspects of the human, animal life is itself humanized. Human beings who take an essentially animal form are used to mark the constitutive outside of humanity proper: the infant savage, the wolf-man, the werewolf, the slave, or the barbarian. Here, the beings situated at the limits of humanity suffer similar consequences to those “animalized” beings caught within the working of the modern anthropological machine. As Agamben suggests, the structure or machine that delimits the contours of the human is perfectly ironic and empty. It does not function by uncovering a uniquely human trait that demarcates a clean break between human and all other nonhuman animals—for, as Agamben himself acknowledges, no such trait or group of traits is to be found. This much we know from current debates in evolutionary biology and animal ethics. And here it is not so much a matter or subscribing to a watered-down, quasi-Darwinian continuism that would blur any and all distinctions one might wish to make between and among human and nonhuman animals but rather recognizing that deciding what constitutes “the human” and “the animal” is never simply a neutral scientific or ontological matter. Indeed, one of the chief merits of *The Open* is that it helps us to see that the locus and stakes of the human-animal distinction are almost always deeplypolitical and ethical**.** For not only does the distinction create the opening for the exploitation of nonhuman animals and others considered not fully human (this is the point that is forcefully made by animal ethicists), but it also *creates the conditions for contemporary biopolitics*, in which more and more of the “biological” and “animal” aspects of human life are brought under the purview of the State and the juridical order. As Agamben has argued in *Homo Sacer* and elsewhere, contemporary biopolitics, whether it manifests itself in totalitarian or democratic form, contains within it the virtual possibility of concentration camps and other violent means of producing and controlling bare life. It comes as no surprise, then, that he does not seek to articulate a more precise, more empirical, or less dogmatic determination of the human-animal distinction. Such a distinction would only redraw the lines of the “object” of biopolitics and further define the scope of its reach. Thus, instead of drawing a new human-animal distinction, Agamben insist that the distinction must be abolished altogether, and along with it the anthropological machine that produces the distinction. Recalling the political consequences that have followed from the modern and premodern separation of “human” and “animal” within human existence, Agamben characterizes the task for thought in the following terms: “it is not so much a matter of asking which of the two machines [ie, the modern or premodern anthropological machine]…is better or more effective—or, rather, less lethal and bloody—as it is of understanding how they work so that we might eventually, be able to stop them” (O, 38).

### Link

Dichotomizing humans and nature turns the case – anthropocentrism ensures the dominant conception of “human rights” will only recreate violence

Lucas-Rose 06 (Rebecca Garcia Lucas-Rose – Trinity College, University of Melbourne, 2006, “Human Rights: ¶ An Earth-based Ethics”, http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/colloquy/download/colloquy\_issue\_12\_november\_2006/rose.pdf) //MD

At present, the extremity of environmental destruction is grossly and ¶ dangerously demonstrating the human attitude of superiority towards the ¶ other, and underlies the modern human-human relationship forged by epistemic hyperseparation. **An inclusion of humans into the prior construction of** ¶ **‘radical nonhuman other’ has escalated in the modern world**. These humans are identified and otherized as variously continuous with nonhuman ¶ nature and thereat discontinuous with the human. Human difference is ¶ constructed as radical difference. Human others have typically included ¶ people with ‘other’ skin colour or ‘other’ religions, cultures or languages, ¶ women, the poor, or minorities. In the interest of human rights then, our reconsideration of dominant modern epistemology, and its inherent epistemology of hyperseparation, should be unreserved. This reconsideration, ¶ then, involves challenging human/nonhuman, mind/nature, mind/body dualisms. ¶ **The ethical implications of centralizing the human-human relationship** ¶ **through an epistemology of hyperseparation are immense. Nonhumans are** ¶ **excluded from ethical concern on the premise that, as a human-human** ¶ **field, ethics is disengaged from the radically other.**19 Developing from an ¶ epistemic rejection of human-nonhuman interrelationship, and subsequently upon the radical exclusion of those classed as ‘other’, ethics is a ¶ flawed agency for human rights.¶ 20 As philosopher and sociologist Mick ¶ Smith puts it, “the ethical cannot be located entirely in the systemic interchanges between individual humans. Ethics also has to include our relations to nature; it is a lived multidimensional relation of care for natural (and ¶ human) others, a relation that originates in part from the environment itself.”21

To discuss oppression as “dehumanizing” only reasserts dominate forms of hierarchy in hidden ways and furthers anthropocentric thought.

**Adams 94** (Carol, feminist scholar and animal rights theorist. M.Div. from Yale Divinity School, B.A. from Rochester University. Neither Beast nor Man, P. 77 http://books.google.com/books?id=CinU6Vy\_sYMC)

It is conventionally said that oppression dehumanizes, that it reduces humans to animal status. But oppression cannot dehumanize animals. Animals exist categorically as that which is not human; they are not acknowledged as having human qualities that can be denied. The presumption of an ontological absence of such human qualities has a priori defined animals as nonhuman. Resistance against oppression for humans involves recognizing and preserving their “humanity.” But, it is a humanity established through a form of negating: just as white Americans knew they were free by the presence of enslaved blacks, so oppressed humans affirm their humanity by proclaiming their distance from the animals whom they are compared to, treated like, but never truly are. A litany of protests erupt from those struggling against oppression, proclamations that assert “we are not beasts, we are humans, not animals!” Given the anthropocentric nature of Western culture’s primary conceptualizations, this response is not surprising. As I indicated in the preface, this has been an assertion upon which feminists early staked their appeal for our rights and freedom. Racist and sexist attitudes expose an elastic, mobile species definition that always advantages elite white males by positioning others as almost beasts. Will antiracist and anti-sexist theory so conclusively accept the inescapable anthropocentricity of the human/animal divide that the result will be a fixed species definition that clearly demarcates once and for all, all humans as human beings, thus tacitly but firmly positioning all other animals as “animals”? Consider the synonyms for beast offered by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Third Edition): “brute, animal, brutish, brutal, beastly, beastial. These adjectives apply to what is more characteristic of lower animals than of human beings.” Will oppositional movements insure that these adjectives always apply only to animals, and thus inscribe as well the hierarchy that positions animals as lower?